German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier has described the current international situation as a “double turning point” — one caused by Russia’s war against Ukraine and another by the changing role of the United States.
His warning about Russia is difficult to dispute. Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine shattered the assumption that major territorial war had become unthinkable in Europe.
But placing the United States alongside Russia within the same political narrative requires more careful examination.
Steinmeier has emphasized that he does not consider the actions of Moscow and Washington identical. Nevertheless, describing both as parallel historic ruptures risks obscuring an uncomfortable fact: the American demand that Europe invest more in its own defense is neither new nor uniquely associated with Donald Trump.
The Warning Predates Trump
The dispute over NATO burden-sharing has existed for decades.
In 2006, NATO defense ministers agreed on a guideline calling for allies to spend two percent of their gross domestic product on defense. In 2014, following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, NATO leaders formally reaffirmed that commitment at the Wales Summit.
That decision was not imposed by Trump. It was made while Barack Obama was president of the United States and Angela Merkel was chancellor of Germany.
Obama repeatedly urged Europe to assume a greater share of responsibility for collective security. During a speech in Strasbourg in 2009, he said Europe should not simply expect the United States to carry the military burden alone. Seven years later, speaking in Germany, he again called for a strong Europe willing to bear its fair share of the common security burden.
The message was clear long before Trump entered the White House:
Europe could not indefinitely depend on American military power while treating its own defense capabilities as a secondary budgetary concern.
Germany Benefited From the Arrangement
For decades, Germany was one of the greatest beneficiaries of the American security umbrella.
The United States stationed forces in Europe, maintained major logistics networks, contributed nuclear deterrence and provided capabilities that many European countries lacked — including strategic airlift, intelligence, missile defense and long-range military support.
At the same time, Germany was able to prioritize other areas of public spending while allowing parts of the Bundeswehr to deteriorate.
This policy was politically comfortable. Defense spending rarely wins elections, and the immediate threat appeared distant after the end of the Cold War.
But the arrangement depended on an assumption: that the United States would continue providing the largest share of European security regardless of how much Europe contributed.
That assumption was always politically fragile.
Trump Changed the Tone, Not the Argument
Donald Trump did not invent the burden-sharing dispute. What he changed was its language and the level of pressure applied to allies.
Previous presidents usually framed increased European spending as a shared strategic responsibility. Trump often presented the issue in transactional terms: America was paying, Europe was benefiting, and countries that failed to spend enough could not automatically expect unlimited protection.
That rhetoric has damaged trust.
A military alliance cannot function like a commercial protection contract. Publicly questioning whether the United States would defend an ally weakens deterrence, because adversaries may begin to doubt NATO’s collective resolve.
Article 5 must remain a credible political commitment, not a bargaining tool that changes according to the mood of a particular administration.
But criticism of Trump’s rhetoric does not erase the substance of the American complaint.
The United States had asked Europe to do more under Republican and Democratic presidents alike. Germany repeatedly heard that message and repeatedly postponed the necessary decisions.
Europe’s Dependence Became a Strategic Risk
The war in Ukraine exposed how deeply Europe had allowed itself to depend on the United States.
European governments provided substantial financial and military support to Kyiv, but many of the most critical capabilities continued to rely heavily on Washington.
This included intelligence, logistics, ammunition, advanced air defense and other military resources that European countries could not quickly replace on their own.
The result is a difficult contradiction:
European leaders increasingly criticize Washington for becoming less predictable, while Europe itself spent years avoiding the investments that could have reduced that dependence.
Strategic autonomy cannot be achieved through speeches. It requires ammunition factories, functioning equipment, trained personnel, logistics, air defense and reliable long-term financing.
Germany has now sharply increased defense spending. The 2026 federal budget provides for approximately €108.2 billion in defense-related expenditure through the regular budget and the Bundeswehr special fund. That represents a historic increase, but it also demonstrates how much rebuilding became necessary after years of delay.
Partnership Is Not One-Sided
A balanced assessment must recognize failures on both sides of the Atlantic.
Washington should not humiliate allies, threaten collective defense or treat decades-old partnerships as disposable transactions.
Germany and other European states, however, cannot demand permanent American guarantees while refusing to make sufficient contributions to the system protecting them.
A genuine alliance is neither blind obedience to Washington nor automatic dependence on American resources.
It is a partnership in which both sides carry meaningful responsibilities.
For the United States, that means maintaining credible commitments and treating allies with respect.
For Germany, it means accepting that national security cannot permanently be outsourced to American taxpayers and American service members.
The Real Turning Point
The true rupture in transatlantic relations is not simply that the United States suddenly became unreliable.
It is that Europe is now being confronted with the consequences of a dependence it helped create.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine destroyed Europe’s remaining illusions about the security environment.
At the same time, the increasingly confrontational American debate over NATO exposed how vulnerable Europe had become after decades of underinvestment.
Those developments are connected, but they are not morally equivalent.
Russia launched a war of aggression against a sovereign country.
The United States, by contrast, has intensified a longstanding demand that European allies assume a greater share of their own defense.
The current American approach can be criticized for its tone, its unpredictability and the damage it may cause to mutual trust. But it should not be portrayed as though Washington suddenly and without warning abandoned a perfectly balanced partnership.
The warnings had been issued for years.
Germany simply preferred not to hear them.
Conclusion
The transatlantic alliance remains essential to both Europe and the United States. Europe benefits from American military power, while Washington benefits from stable allies, overseas bases, economic partnerships and strategic influence.
Neither side gains from the collapse of that relationship.
But preserving the alliance requires greater honesty.
America must understand that leadership is more than demanding payment.
Germany must understand that solidarity is more than demanding protection.
Europe does not need to turn away from the United States. It needs to become strong enough to stand beside it.


















































































































































































































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